地方高校教师科研绩效激励机制实证研究
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D06

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Research on the Incentive Mechanism of Scientific Research Performance of Local Universities TeachersLiu Xin-min 1 2, Yu Hui-xin 2
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    摘要:

    高水平的科研成果不仅是广大教师的职业追求,也是高校核心竞争力的集中体现,设计科学合理的科研产出激励机制可以促进双方的共赢。在分析影响教师科研产出关键因素基础上,探索教师科研绩效的激励机制,以激发高校教师围绕学科建设主动开展科学研究,创造更多的学术成果。本文以委托-代理理论为研究基础,通过分析建构激励模型得出教师努力水平不可观测时的最优激励合同及其影响因素。研究结果表明:(1)教师的最佳收益与初始工资水平、平台环境、激励水平、产出效率存在正向影响;而与从事科研工作的努力成本系数存在负向影响。(2)高校的最佳收益与平台环境、单位产出收益存在正向影响;与教师初始工资水平存在负向影响。

    Abstract:

    High-quality research achievement is not only the career pursuit of most teachers, but also represents the core competitiveness of universities in higher education. Scientific design of incentive mechanism for research outcome can help to promote the win-win situation. This paper aims to discuss the incentive mechanism of research achievement based on analyzing the key factors influencing research achievement, and then stimulate the initiative of university teachers to do scientific research in combination with their majors and create more educational value. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper constructs the incentive model through analysis, works out the Optimal Incentive Contract and related influencing factors as the teachers’ efforts could not be observed. The results show the following research findings. Firstly, the teachers optimal benefit is positively related to the initial pay level, platform environment, incentive level and output efficiency, negatively related to research difficulty. Secondly, universities optimal benefit is positively related to platform environment, units output gains, negatively related to initial pay level.

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刘新民,俞会新.地方高校教师科研绩效激励机制实证研究[J].技术经济,2020,39(11):175-182+191.

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  • 收稿日期:2020-02-23
  • 最后修改日期:2020-11-16
  • 录用日期:2020-05-22
  • 在线发布日期: 2020-12-09
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