不完全信息静态博弈视角下的三度价格歧视分析研究
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F224; F272.3;F274

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Analysis and Research on Third-degree Price Discrimination from the Perspective of Incomplete Information Static Game
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    摘要:

    本文针对三度价格歧视存在信息不对称的问题,讨论了两个寡头垄断企业在成本信息不对称的情况下,在两个细分市场实施价格歧视的产量决策问题。将成本函数分为三种,两种以及一种可选成本(完全信息)三类情况,通过海萨尼转换,根据成本甄别系数的不同取值范围,得出了两个寡头垄断企业相互制约下的均衡产量、均衡价格、均衡利润以及相互关系。研究结果表明:成本甄别系数越小,成本信息劣势企业的均衡产量越高,均衡状态下的总利润也越高;当寡头垄断企业1采用较高成本时,企业1会更加倾向于隐藏自身成本,他在具有信息优势的同时还具有成本劣势;而当寡头垄断企业1采用低成本时,则不会隐藏自己的信息而更倾向通过信号传递,把低成本信息的优势传递出去,以使寡头垄断企业2按完全信息决策产量等结论。本文的研究结果将为信息不对称下的歧视定价提供理论依据。

    Abstract:

    Aiming at the problem of information asymmetry in the third-degree price discrimination, the production decision-making problem of two oligopolistic enterprises when implement price discrimination in two market segments is discussed, under the condition of asymmetric cost information. The cost function is divided into three categories、two optional cost and one optional cost (complete information). According to the different value range of the cost discrimination coefficient, the equilibrium output, equilibrium price and equilibrium profit of the two oligopolistic enterprises under mutual restriction and their relationship are obtained by applying the Harsanyi transformation. It is shown that: the smaller the cost discrimination coefficient, the higher the balanced production and total profit under equilibrium of enterprises with inferior cost information. When the cost of oligopolistic enterprise 1 is high, enterprise 1 will prefer to hide its own costs. It then has advantage in information and disadvantage in cost simultaneously. When the cost of oligopolistic enterprise 1 is low, enterprise 1 will not hide its information and prefer to transmit the advantages of low-cost information through signal transmission. So that the oligopolistic enterprise 2 will make decisions of production and others based on complete information. The results will provide a theoretical basis for discrimination pricing under asymmetric information.

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薛凤,陈光宇,钱茜,文杜鹃.不完全信息静态博弈视角下的三度价格歧视分析研究[J].技术经济,2021,40(4):65-76.

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  • 收稿日期:2020-02-28
  • 最后修改日期:2021-03-01
  • 录用日期:2020-07-14
  • 在线发布日期: 2021-03-31
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