From the perspective of agency cost and management expectation, this paper analyzes the different effects of senior executives'' military experience on cost stickiness, and empirically tests the impact consequences and paths of senior executives'' military experience on Cost Stickiness and the degree of impact under different corporate governance environments with the sample data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2018. The results show that executives'' military experience inhibits the Cost Stickiness of enterprises to a certain extent. Further test found that: management self-interest is the intermediary variable between senior executives'' military experience and cost stickiness, that is, senior executives'' military experience can reduce self-interest behavior and alleviate agency problems, so as to inhibit the Cost Stickiness of enterprises. Distinguishing different corporate governance environments inside and outside, it is found that when the independent director''s supervision power is insufficient or the product market competition is low, the inhibitory effect of senior executives'' military experience on Cost Stickiness is more significant, indicating that when the corporate governance mechanism is insufficient, senior executives'' military experience plays a complementary role and alleviates the agency problem more obviously. By distinguishing the nature of property rights, the inhibitory effect of senior executives'' military experience on Cost Stickiness is more obvious in non-state-owned enterprises, which shows that senior executives'' military experience can play its unique effect in non-state-owned enterprises and effectively inhibit the Cost Stickiness of enterprises. The contribution of this paper is to reveal the inhibitory effect of senior executives'' military experience on cost stickiness, and expand the research on the economic consequences of senior executives'' heterogeneity and the influencing factors of cost stickiness.