From the perspective of external governance, the impact and mechanism of analyst coverage on entity enterprise financialization behavior are empirically studied. It is found that analyst coverage has a significant negative impact on entity enterprise financialization, the higher the degree of analyst coverage, the lower the level of enterprise financialization. After controlling endogeneity, the results remain robust. Further researches show that analyst coverage mainly affects enterprise financialization through reducing the degree of information asymmetry and alleviating enterprise agency conflict；moreover，analyst coverage has a more obvious negative effect on enterprise financialization in state-owned enterprises and companies with poor corporate governance. Analyst coverage can promote firms’ innovation and physical capital investment by suppressing enterprise financialization. This paper not only enriches the research in the fields of corporate external governance and enterprise financialization, but also provides empirical evidence for strengthening the construction of analyst team and preventing the “disenchantment from reality” of the real economy.