国企混改、高管薪酬激励与全要素生产率
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南京信息工程大学

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F271

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国家社会科学基金项目


Mixed reform of State-owned Enterprises, Executive Compensation Incentive and Total Factor Productivity
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Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology

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    摘要:

    基于我国国有企业混合所有制改革背景,以2004-2020年沪深A股国有上市公司为样本,实证检验混合所有制改革对国有企业全要素生产率的影响及其作用机制。区别多数文献对混合所有制改革虚拟变量的处理,本文采用混合所有制改革程度(第一大非国有股东持股比例超过5%)进行量化。在作用机制检验中,采用两种常用的中介效应检验法,同时为了提高对中介效应的检验力和结果的解释性,使用非参数Bootstrapping方法调整估计偏差的结构方程模型进行多重中介效应检验。研究结果表明,混合所有制改革对国有企业全要素生产率具有显著的正向促进作用,在一系列稳健性检验后,结论依然成立;异质性检验发现,混合所有制改革对国有企业全要素生产率的积极作用在地方国有企业、引入的非国有资本为民营资本以及混改后依然国有控股的样本企业中更为显著;高管的货币性薪酬和股权薪酬激励承担了大部分中介效应,其中货币性薪酬激励的作用更为突出,在使用与基准回归相似的稳健性检验后,中介效应依然显著成立。

    Abstract:

    Based on the background of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in China and the sample data of state-owned listed companies from 2004 to 2020, the impact of mixed ownership reform on total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises and its mechanism were empirically examined. Different from the treatment of dummy variables of mixed ownership reform in most literatures, the degree of mixed ownership reform (the shareholding ratio of the largest non-state-owned shareholder exceeds 5%) was quantified. In the test of the mechanism of action, commonly used mediating effect tests were used. Non-parametric Bootstrapping method was used to adjust the structural equation model of the estimated deviation to conduct multiple mediation effect test. This way could improve the testing power of the mediation effect and the interpretation of the results. The results show that mixed ownership reform has a significant positive effect on total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises, and the conclusion still holds after a series of robustness tests. Heterogeneity test shows that the positive effect of mixed ownership reform on total factor productivity of soes is more significant in local soes, the non-state-owned capital introduced as private capital, and the sample enterprises still holding state-owned shares after mixed ownership reform. The monetary compensation and equity compensation incentive of executives bear most of the mediation effect, especially the monetary compensation incentive of executives. After using the robustness test similar to benchmark regression, the mediation effect still holds significantly.

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李晓庆,李萌菡.国企混改、高管薪酬激励与全要素生产率[J].技术经济,2022,41(9):36-49.

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  • 收稿日期:2022-04-22
  • 最后修改日期:2022-09-02
  • 录用日期:2022-08-08
  • 在线发布日期: 2022-10-14
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