Central environmental protection inspector is a major reform measure in the field of environmental protection in China in recent years, which is not only conducive to improving the level of environmental governance, but also has an impact on the decision-making of resource allocation of micro-enterprises. Based on the data of China''s A-share listed industrial enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2020, this paper empirically tests the influence of central environmental protection inspectors on excessive financialization of enterprises by using multi-period double difference method. It is found that the central environmental protection inspector can inhibit the excessive financialization of enterprises. The test of influence mechanism shows that the central environmental protection inspector will inhibit the excessive financialization of enterprises by improving the green investment of enterprises. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the central environmental protection inspector has a stronger inhibitory effect on excessive financialization of enterprises in enterprises with high financing constraints, executives without public working experience and enterprises in areas with high public environmental concern. The test of economic consequences shows that the central environmental protection inspector has improved the performance of enterprises by restraining excessive financialization of enterprises. The research conclusion analyzes the mechanism of macro-environmental policy on micro-enterprise resource allocation decision, which has certain practical significance for achieving a win-win situation of environmental governance and economic development.