考虑集成商营销努力的养老服务提供商服务质量激励研究
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作者:
作者单位:

1.长沙理工大学;2.长沙理工大学经济与管理学院;3.中南林业科技大学物流与交通学院

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中图分类号:

F272.3

基金项目:

教育部人文社科青年项目 “供需精准匹配视域下养老服务递送质量的提升路径研究”(22YJCZH221); 湖南省自然科学基金青年项目“社会化媒体下“认知-偏好-意愿”驱动的智慧健康养老服务消费激励策略研究”(2022JJ40515); 湖南省教育厅优秀青年项目“社会化媒体下基于“认知-信任-偏好”的居家养老服务支付意愿研究”(21B0341);湖南省自然科学基金青年基金项目“基于区块链技术的供应链产品质量控制机制研究”(2021JJ41089);湖南省自然科学青年基金“以次充好掺假行为下农产品供应链质量甄别与激励合约设计研究”(2021JJ40614)


The Incentive Study on the Quality Improvement of Elderly Service Providers Considering the Marketing Efforts of Integrators
Author:
Affiliation:

1.School of Economics Management,Changsha University of Science Technology;2.School of Economics Management,Changsha University of Science Technology;3.School of Logistics and Transportation,Central South University of Forestry and Technology

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    摘要:

    在考虑养老服务集成商营销努力的情况下,通过设计成本分担契约、收益共享契约激励养老服务提供商改善服务质量,分析了两类激励契约的适用条件;比较了对养老服务质量、营销水平决策和各成员利润的改善作用。研究结果表明:提供商的服务质量、利润会随着成本分担比例的增加而递增,随着收益共享比例的增加而递减;集成商的营销水平会随着成本分担比例的增加而增加,而随着收益共享比例的增加而递减,利润水平会随着成本分担比例和收益共享比例的增加而递减;需求影响系数对三种情境下的提供商和集成商利润产生正向作用,签订成本分担契约对提供商较为有利,集成商可能更倾向于收益共享契约;成本影响系数则对利润产生负向作用,签订收益共享契约对提供商较为有利,对于集成商来说,其利润在三种情境下的差异不大;成本分担契约对激励提供商改善服务质量和集成商提升营销水平具有最佳的激励作用。在大多数情况下,提供商获得的利润总是高于集成商。

    Abstract:

    Considering the marketing level of integrators, it is of great practical significance to discuss how to motivate providers to improve the quality of old-age care service and improve their profits with integrators. This paper established an incentive model for the improvement of service quality for the elderly considering the marketing efforts, and analyzes the applicable conditions of the cost-sharing contract and the revenue-sharing contract. The improvement of service quality, marketing level and profit of each member was compared. The research results shown that: The service quality and profit of the provider will increase with the increase of the cost-sharing ratio, but decrease with the increase of the revenue-sharing ratio; The marketing level of integrators will increase with the increase of cost-sharing ratio, but decrease with the increase of revenue-sharing ratio, and the profit level will decrease with the increase of the cost-sharing ratio and revenue-sharing ratio; The profit of providers and integrators has a positive effect under the three scenarios of demand impact coefficient. It is more advantageous for providers to sign cost-sharing contracts, and integrators may be more inclined to yield sharing contracts. The cost impact coefficient has a negative effect on profit. It is more beneficial for the provider to sign a revenue sharing contract. For the integrator, the profit varies little under the three scenarios. The cost sharing contract incentive providers to improve the service quality, marketing level has the best incentive effect. In most cases, the provider"s profits is always higher than that of integrators, operators should be flexible in using of contract according to the variation of the reality of old-care service quality improvement of behavior incentive and improve the profitability of providers and integrators.

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引用本文

易丹,胡俊,胡韩莉,李青松.考虑集成商营销努力的养老服务提供商服务质量激励研究[J].技术经济,2023,42(12):152-161.

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历史
  • 收稿日期:2023-09-14
  • 最后修改日期:2023-12-25
  • 录用日期:2023-10-18
  • 在线发布日期: 2024-01-09
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