Abstract:Innovation is crucial for achieving high-level self-reliance and accelerating the development of new-quality productivity in the current stage of development. However, the high-risk and long-term nature of innovation can make it difficult for enterprise managers to maintain a consistent focus on innovation. Despite this, few studies have systematically examined how managerial shortsightedness affects an enterprise''s dual innovation activities.Drawing on the upper echelons theory, this paper constructs panel data from 2,139 Chinese A-share-listed manufacturing companies covering the period from 2007 to 2020. It empirically explores the impact of managers'' intrinsic myopia on the performance of both exploratory and exploitative innovation. This is achieved by constructing managerial myopia indexes using textual analysis techniques and further analyzing the mediating role of firms'' dual innovation inputs and the weighting of management incentives in this process.The study finds that: (1) managerial myopia has a significant negative impact on firms'' dual innovation performance; (2) managerial myopia inhibits both exploratory and exploitative innovation inputs, thereby suppressing dual innovation performance outputs; and (3) equity incentives mitigate the negative impact of managerial myopia on dual innovation performance, while compensation incentives exacerbate the negative impact on exploratory innovation performance and alleviate the negative impact on exploitative innovation performance.This study expands the analysis of the behavioral consequences of managerial myopia on corporate innovation and its mechanisms of action. It provides important theoretical and practical insights for optimizing corporate innovation governance mechanisms, motivating and guiding enterprises to enhance their independent innovation capabilities, and thus accelerating the formation and development of new-quality productivity.